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Introduction 
The use of subsidies by national governments often makes headline news in the 
European financial press and European Commission attempts to curb intervention are 
frequently controversial. The control of State aids1 is a key component of the EU 
competition rules and has become an increasingly important strand of the internal 
market provisions. The European Commission’s role in disciplining subsidies is 
unique in international law. This is not only because its supranational authority is 
unparalleled, but also because the context for its decisions extends beyond 
considering the economic impacts that are familiar to trade economists; the 
Commission must assess the potential trade and competition effects of State aid 
against the contribution that intervention could make to wider EU Treaty objectives 
such as economic and social cohesion, sustainable development and research and 
technological development. 
Provisions on the control of State aids were included in the Treaty of Rome from 
the outset. The authors of the Treaty clearly recognised that some means of limiting 
subsidies and other forms of government intervention were vital in the establishment 
of a ‘common market’; as barriers to trade – tariffs, quotas, discriminatory standards, 
and so on – were being outlawed, the temptation for Member States to resort to other 
types of protectionism was considered likely to increase. In the 1980s this view was 
reinforced. The further dismantling of trade barriers to take place as part of the Single 
Market programme would leave subsidies as one of the few remaining instruments of 
protectionism available to governments and make their effects more keenly felt by 
 
1 The definition of a State aid is discussed later; it is somewhat wider in scope than a subsidy. 
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competitors of beneficiary firms. As a result, the control of State aid began to move 
higher up the Commission’s policy agenda in the early 1990s (Brittan, 1989). 
In contrast with the competition rules addressing the behaviour of firms 
(restrictive practices and abuse of dominant position) the use of the State aid 
provisions was very tentative in the early years of the Community. EU State aid 
control was long regarded as the Cinderella of the EU competition rules, and 
consequently omitted from many volumes on the subject; it is, however, increasingly 
being seen as a policy that has come of age. Over the last few years State aid control 
procedures have been progressively formalised and a higher priority has been given to 
the enforcement of Commission decisions (Hansen, van Ysendyck and Zulhkle, 
2004).  
In terms of substance, the scope of Commission scrutiny has broadened beyond 
the ‘classic’ instruments of government intervention such as grants, soft loans and 
capital injections to include aspects of fiscal and social security systems and the 
financing of public service obligations. Moreover, the liberalisation of large segments 
of hitherto state-owned monopoly sectors has increased the range of activities 
potentially open to competition and therefore subject to the State aid rules. In parallel, 
however, the environment in which policy operates has become increasingly complex. 
Successive Treaty amendments have emphasised the linkages between policy areas, 
such as the requirement for national and EU policies to contribute to economic and 
social cohesion. Of key importance, enlargement to embrace ten new Member States 
presents significant challenges both to the substance of policy and to its practical 
application.  
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At macroeconomic and political levels, attitudes towards State aids have been 
influenced by the so-called Lisbon agenda,2 with the Council of Ministers taking a 
growing interest in the scale and efficiency of government intervention, reflected in 
the declared objective of ‘less aid, but better’. However, while the Council has 
ostensibly become increasingly supportive of Commission attempts to rein-in State 
aids, this commitment is often noticeably absent when national interests are at stake in 
individual cases, typifying the ambivalence encapsulated in former Commissioner 
Peter Sutherland’s observation that: ‘in my time in the Commission I have detected a 
marked tendency in all Member States to regard other people’s State aids as bad and 
their own as fully justified.’(Sutherland, 1987). 
Against the backdrop of this changing economic and geopolitical environment, 
this chapter provides an overview of the key elements and recent evolution of State 
aid control policy. The chapter is structured in four parts as follows. The first part sets 
out the broad context and aims of State aid control. The second part identifies the 
types of instrument that are subject to scrutiny – in other words, what constitutes a 
State aid? This is a crucial issue since measures that distort competition, but do not 
involve State aid, must be dealt with under other Treaty provisions, with notably less 
powerful means of redress. The third part of the chapter reviews the Commission’s 
approach to State aid in different policy areas, exploring how the Commission has 
interpreted its role in balancing trade and competition considerations against the wider 
objectives of the European Union. The final part of the chapter discusses a number of 
 
2  The commitment made by the European Council in March 2000 for the EU to become ‘the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy by 2010.’ This was to be achieved 
by a series of goals in areas such as employment, innovation, enterprise, liberalisation and the 
environment. 
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current themes in the evolution of policy, considers key recent developments against 
this background and highlights some future issues and challenges in State aid control. 
The context and rationale for State aid control 
In spite of the evolving context for policy, the basis for the control of State aids has 
remained substantially unchanged since the Treaty of Rome. The key provisions are 
set out in Articles 87 to 89 of the EC Treaty. In essence, Article 87 prohibits State 
aids, subject to certain exceptions; Article 88 sets out the role of the European 
Commission and of the Member States; and Article 89 enables the Council to adopt 
Regulations for the implementation of Article 87 and 88. The key player, however, is 
the European Commission which arguably has more autonomy and authority over the 
Member States in this sphere than in any other arena of EU policy; it has 
progressively extended the scope of its discipline over government intervention and 
increasingly sought to monitor and to reduce overall levels of spend. This section 
begins by outlining the legal basis for restricting the use of State aid, before 
discussing the role of the European Commission and providing an indication of the 
overall scale of State aid spending. 
The legal basis for State aid control 
The first paragraph of Article 87 provides for a general prohibition of State aids 
insofar as they affect trade between the Member States. 
The second paragraph (Article 87(2)), indicates those aids that are de jure 
exempted from this general ban. Three categories of aid are identified. In broad terms, 
these are: aids of a ‘social’ nature;3 aids related to the damage caused by natural 
disasters;4 and aids to parts of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the 
 
3  Aid must be granted to individual consumers and not undertakings.  
4  Such as floods, droughts, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. 
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division of Germany.5 The third paragraph (Article 87(3)) outlines those types of aid 
that may be considered to be compatible with the common market. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Article 87 is that it does not define what an 
aid actually is. Schina (1987, p. 13) takes the view that this apparent omission was 
intentional on the part of the authors of the Treaty; a clear definition would simply 
have encouraged governments to find ingenious ways of circumventing the rules. 
Moreover, a consideration of the wide-ranging powers accorded to the European 
Commission in the implementation of Article 87 supports this view. Importantly, the 
definition of State aid is not static and the scope of Article 87(1) is frequently the 
subject of Commission decisions or European Court of Justice rulings that fine-tune, 
or sometimes radically extend, the range and type of measures that are subject to 
control. These definitional issues are not mere legal niceties, but questions of 
fundamental importance to policymakers in the Member States and to actual or 
potential beneficiaries and competitors alike. The second section of this chapter 
addresses the question of what is meant by ‘State aid’ under the Treaty. 
Although, as described, in principle State aids are banned under the Treaty, 
Articles 87(2) and (3) provide for a number of exceptions. Article 87(2), which 
provides for some mandatory derogations from the ban is relatively restrictive in 
scope and has generally been uncontroversial. By contrast, the interpretation of 
Article 87(3) has resulted in a significant body of soft law and, increasingly, 
secondary legislation. This has led to the authorisation of State aid for a range of 
policy purposes such as regional development, research and development, supporting 
 
5  For most of the post-war period the German Federal government operated special measures 
for the so-called Zonal Border Area (the Zonenrandgebiet) and West Berlin under these 
provisions. Since reunification this provision has scarcely been invoked but the German 
authorities have sought its retention in successive Treaty amendments. In the draft 
Constitution, there is scope for this provision to be repealed after five years. 
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small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and environmental protection. The 
interpretation of Article 87(3) is discussed in the third section of this chapter. 
Before moving on to the substantive issues covered in the rest of this chapter, it is 
worth outlining the role of the European Commission in State aid control and 
providing some indication of the scale of policy both in terms of Member States’ 
spending on State aids and Commission activity to control it.  
Role of the European Commission 
Article 88 of the Treaty gives the European Commission wide-ranging powers in the 
sphere of State aid control. Indeed, it has arguably more autonomy in this field of EU 
policy than any other. There are three principal aspects to these powers. First, the 
Commission has a general duty to review aid and propose ‘any appropriate measures 
required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the Common 
Market’ (Article 88(1)). Second, Member States must notify the Commission of any 
plans to offer aid in advance of implementation, in order for the Commission to assess 
their compatibility with the common market. This means, in effect, that there is a 
‘stand still’ requirement – aid cannot be paid until the Commission has given its 
approval. Unnotified aid or aid paid prior to approval is illegal and the Commission 
can require its repayment. Third, after formal investigation, to which other Member 
States and third parties may contribute, the Commission can require Member States to 
abolish or amend aid measures if it considers them incompatible with the Common 
Market.  
The basic provisions of Article 88 have been subject to much case law.6 This was 
largely codified in a procedural regulation adopted in 1998,7 which also reinforced the 
 
6  See, for example, R. D’Sa 1998, but note that several important procedural developments 
postdate this book. 
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Commission’s powers to order the repayment of illegal aid. It is also important to note 
that aggrieved competitors can complain to the Commission about aid believed to 
have been paid out illegally, or can bring a case before the national courts, which can 
declare aid unlawful and order its repayment. For its part, the European Court of 
Justice has played an important role in buttressing the Commission’s authority, 
particularly in the early case law on procedural matters, and has employed a relatively 
light touch in its scrutiny of the Commission’s interpretation of substantive matters, 
thereby reinforcing the discretionary powers of the Commission.  
The combination of discretion and exclusive competence might lead to the 
perception that the Commission is legislator, policeman, prosecutor and judge in 
matters of State aid. For all this, the Commission’s task in disciplining State aids is 
not unfettered. Commission’s decisions are subject to appeal before the European 
Courts by Member States or by interested parties, such as competitors of aid 
beneficiaries. Moreover, the very fact that it is the policies of Member State 
governments that are subject to control means that decisions are often highly 
sensitive, especially where national interests are stake. Cases of major national 
importance – such as aid for the restructuring of a firm where many jobs are at risk – 
are often the subject of face-to-face negotiations between ministers and the 
Commissioner for Competition Policy. In consequence, outcomes have frequently 
been regarded as politically motivated. The perception that the Commission simply 
bows to pressure from Member States is, however, increasingly outmoded; in recent 
years the Commission has been more and more willing to reach negative decisions on 
State aid in sensitive cases and to enforce decisions with recovery orders where aid 
 
7  See Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of 
the EC Treaty, OJEC No L 140 of 30 April 2004, pp 1-134. 
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has already been paid. For example, in July 2004 the Commission ordered the 
repayment of aid estimated at up to €1.1 billion by France Télécom.8 Where Member 
States fail to recover illegal aid, the Commission can, and does, refer the matter to the 
European Court of Justice. Competition Commission Neelie Kroes has confirmed her 
intention to ‘take a very strict line with Member States that fail to comply with 
Commission decisions on state aid. Taking a firm stand is the only way of ensuring 
the credibility of our state aid policy.’9 
The Commission typically registers up to 1000 State aid cases annually, around 
half of which concern manufacturing and services.10 Recent trends in the origin of 
these latter cases are set out in Table 1. 
Table 1: State aid cases registered (excluding agriculture, fisheries, transport 
and coal) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Notified aid 510 680 550 515 342 469 473 322 349 306 
Unnotified aid 68 113 91 140 97 98 86 46 67 53 
Existing aid 16 10 3 1 5 2 10 49 5 18 
Complaints       94 152 192 175 
TOTAL 594 803 644 656 444 569 663 569 613 552 
Source: Compiled from European Commission annual competition reports, various 
editions. 
In practice, the scale of Commission activity in monitoring State aid is difficult to 
assess meaningfully. In particular, a notified aid may involve an aid scheme or 
programme for which there may ultimately be hundreds or even thousands of 
beneficiaries or it may involve assistance to a single firm; each counts as one 
 
8  RAPID Press Release, Commission rules that France Télécom received illicit aid and orders 
that it be paid back to the state, IP/04/981 (Brussels, 20 July 2004). 
9  RAPID Press Release, Commission refers Germany to Court of Justice for failure to recover 
illegal aid to Kahla, IP/05/189 (Brussels, 16 February 2005). 
10  Distinct rules apply to agriculture, fisheries, transport and coal and the lead in implementing 
State aid policy in these sectors is taken by the relevant ‘sectoral’ directorates-general, as 
opposed to DG Competition. 
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notification. In similar vein, the table suggests an overall decline in the number of aids 
notified. However, this partly reflects the adoption of a number of block exemption 
Regulations that enable national authorities to implement particular types of aid 
scheme, without prior authorisation from the Commission, on condition that certain 
precise criteria are met. The aim of these Regulations, which concern support for 
SMEs, for training and for employment, is to reduce the administrative burden on the 
Commission. Perhaps most interesting is the significant rise in the number of cases 
arising from complaints (although it would appear that data was simply not 
disaggregated in this way prior to 2000, rather than there being no complaints before 
this date). In the 1990s the Commission actively promoted the role of third parties in 
enforcement. To some extent, though, the implications were double-edged; the 
Commission was sometimes forced into reactive mode by challenges from third 
parties, with implications for the coherence of policy and its ability to set the policy 
agenda (Mitchell, 2001). 
As Table 2 shows, the Commission raises no objections to the majority of State 
aids considered by it. This might lead to the conclusion that the Commission is 
relatively ineffective in disciplining State aids. However, the opposite conclusion can 
also be reached: the Commission has become increasingly explicit about the types and 
forms of aid11 that can be exempted from the general ban on State aid so that 
policymakers can, with some confidence, design measures that are likely to be 
‘rubber-stamped’ for approval. For its part, the Commission must open the formal 
investigation procedure if it has any doubts about the compatibility of the measure 
concerned with the common market. 
 
11  Reflected in the growing body of aid codes, communications and frameworks covering a 
range of policy areas – see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/>  
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Table 2: Trends in Commission Decisions 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
No objection 440 504 373 385 308 258 330 315 271 
Initiation of formal scrutiny 40 57 43 68 66 62 65 67 62 
Positive  15 22 14 18 16 28 11 15 29 
Negative 3 9 23 9 31 30 5 26 37 
Conditional 2 5 3 5 8 3 0 3 5 
Appropriate measures/other 27 22 18 17 31 63 34 25 33 
TOTAL 527 619 474 502 460 444 445 451 437 
Source: European Commission annual competition reports, various editions. 
It is now well-established that the Commission has the authority to require the 
repayment, with interest, of aid paid out illegally. Moreover, provisions of national 
law, involving, for example, the principle of legitimate expectation12 can provide no 
shelter. In practice, though, enforcement of repayment orders remains problematic, 
depending as it does, mainly on national authorities. No systematic information 
appears to be available either on the number and scale of recovery orders or on the 
amounts actually repaid. However, the Commission’s 1998 annual competition report 
indicates that 24 repayment orders were made in that year, most involving individual 
awards to firms (principally firms in difficulty), but some involving aid schemes with 
potentially many hundreds of beneficiaries (European Commission 1999, p 305). The 
same report listed 19 recovery orders dating back to 1987 that had not yet been repaid. 
More recently, in 2003 the Commission took 11 (partly) negative decisions involving 
the recovery of over € 1.3 billion. At February 2004, some 88 recovery orders were 
pending, of which 40 concerned Germany and 20 concerned Spain (European 
Commission, 2004). 
Scale of State aid spending  
In the mid-1980s the Commission began to focus on the scale of State aid as part of 
its attempts to target particular categories of support in the run-up to the completion of 
 
12  The notion that firms should be entitled to assume that the award of State aid was lawful. 
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the internal market. The aim was to produce an inventory of aid schemes and 
accompanying expenditure data. In practice, owing to pressure from the Member 
States at the time, only the latter has ever been published. Initially this took the form 
of so-called State aid Surveys which were published every two years. Latterly, these 
have been superseded by the more regular ‘Scoreboards’,13 instigated to monitor the 
Stockholm European Council commitment in 2001 to ‘demonstrate a downward trend 
in State aid in relation to GDP by 2003’ and also to ‘redirect aid toward horizontal 
objectives’.14 
Table 3: Trends in State Aid Expenditure (EU15) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total aid exc railways € 
billion 
70.4 75.2 72.4 71.0 71.5 67.1 60.5 52.5 50.9 49.5 48.8 
Total aid exc 
agriculture fisheries and 
transport € billion 
54.4 60.2 55.4 52.6 54.2 50.2 46.4 37.6 36.6 35.4 34 
Total aid exc railways 
% of GDP 
1.09 1.18 1.11 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.77 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.56 
Total aid exc 
agriculture fisheries and 
transport % of GDP 
0.85 0.95 0.85 0.74 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.39 
Source: Extracted from European Commission, 2004.  
European Commission sources suggest that EU15 expenditure in 2002 totalled almost 
€49 billion for all sectors, except railways; and €34 billion when agriculture, fisheries 
and transport were excluded (see Table 3). In terms of its weight in the economy, 
there is a fairly clear downward trend over the past decade. Nevertheless, these 
aggregate figures conceal some significant differences between countries. Aid as a 
percentage of GDP in 2002 ranges from 0.16 (Sweden) to 0.72 (Denmark); measured 
 
13  The Scoreboards and the later Surveys are available on the DG Competition website at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html>  
14  The overall aim here is to reduce aid considered most harmful, specifically, rescue and 
restructuring aid, sectoral aid and ad hoc aid, this latter being offered to an individual firm on 
a one-off basis rather than as part of an aid scheme that is ostensibly generally-available. 
Horizontal objectives are not listed exhaustively but include research and development, 
support for SMEs, environmental protection and, explicitly, cohesion. Cohesion is not, 
however, defined.  
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in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) per head, spending in 2000-2 averaged just 36 
in the UK, as against 228 in Denmark.  
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Table 4: State Aid for Horizontal Objectives and Particular Sectors 2002 (% of total, excluding agriculture, fisheries and railways) 
 EU Bel Den Ger Gre Spa Fra Ire Ita Lux Net Aus Por Fin Swe UK 
Horizontal 
Objectives 
73 97 100 66 100 67 60 49 96 92 98 96 39 98 84 70 
Research and 
Development  
15 15 5 14 10 12 18 8 13 9 26 33 5 45 18 27 
Environment 16 0 53 30 - 4 3 0 0 0 39 19 5 21 39 5 
SME  14 20 1 6 16 20 17 2 33 21 4 17 15 7 5 15 
Commerce  1 0 - 0 - 0 2 - 2 1 5 - 0 4 - 0 
Employment 
aid 
2 7 34 0 - 3 0 8 1 - 0 4 6 6 - 0 
Training aid 2 2 3 0 - 8 0 4 1 - - 10 5 0 1 2 
Regional 
development  
23 52 3 16 74 19 18 26 46 61 24 14 3 16 21 21 
Particular 
sectors 
27 3 0 34 0 33 40 51 4 8 2 4 61 2 16 30 
Manufacturing 3 - 0 4 0 5 2 35 3 - 2 4 4 0 - 1 
Coal  16 - - 30 - 28 16 - - - - - - - - 1 
Other Non-
manufacturing 
Sectors 
2 - - - - 0 0 - 0 - - 0 - - - 28 
Financial 
Services 
5 - - - - - 22 14 - - - - 57 - - - 
Other services 0 3 - 0 - 0 - 3 - 8 - - 0 2 16 - 
Total aid less 
agriculture, 
fisheries and 
railways (€ 
m)  
34005 933 1274 11431 410 3503 6197 525 4528 56 780 453 649 231 406 2629 
Source: European Commission 2004, but the figures for Finland have been recalculated by the author to take account of an error later identified 
in the R&D expenditure data by the Commission. 
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There are also significant disparities between countries in the shares of expenditure 
aimed at various policy objectives, as illustrated in Table 4. For example, 53 per cent 
of Danish expenditure (excluding that on agriculture, fisheries and railways) is 
targeted at environmental protection, but in most other countries (Austria, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden being the exceptions), this amounts to less 
than five per cent of the total. Research and development aid accounts for around a 
third of the total in Austria, but just five per cent of spending in Portugal. 
There are, however, considerable methodological difficulties involved in 
gathering and analysing the data, some of which undermine its usefulness. In 
particular, depending on data availability, the figures mix expenditure committed and 
that actually paid out. In addition, many aid schemes have multiple policy objectives, 
so that the apparent absence of spending on a given policy does not reflect reality but 
rather the way in which measures are classified for statistical purposes. In spite of 
these misgivings, the Commission reports remain the only comparable source of 
information on aid spending. 
What is a State aid? 
The absence of a concrete definition of State aid was alluded to earlier. Article 87(1) 
states that:  
‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the common market.’ 
These provisions have been elaborated in a substantial body of case law and 
Commission decisions spanning a period of over 30 years. Space prohibits an 
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extensive discussion of definitional issues here, and the topic is well covered in the 
literature (for example, Bacon, 2003). Nevertheless, it is worth outlining the scope of 
what is currently understood by State aid.  
There are five main aspects of the definition of a State aid: the notion of ‘aid’; that 
it must be granted ‘by a Member State or through State resources’; that it may be ‘in 
any form whatsoever’; that it must ‘distort or threaten to distort competition’; and that 
it must do so by ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. 
Concept of aid 
The notion of aid was considered early on by the European Court of Justice in the 
context of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty. The Court concluded that 
an aid was a wider concept than a subsidy and extended to intervention which 
mitigated charges normally incurred by an undertaking. 15 The Court later also argued 
that if the effect of a measure was to provide a benefit, then it should be regarded as 
aid, even if this was not the primary intention of the measure. 16 In other words, aid 
involves an advantage that would not be conferred in the normal operations of an 
undertaking. 
State and State resources 
Commission decisions supported by Court of Justice rulings have resulted in a wide 
definition of the terms ‘State’ and ‘State resources’. It is now clear that the Treaty 
provisions cover measures by all public bodies, or agencies acting on their behalf, at 
national, regional and local levels. 
The extent of this definition has important consequences not just for the range of 
measures potentially concerned, and their complexity, but also for domestic 
 
15  De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community [1961] ECR 1. 
16  Italian Government v Commission [1974] ECR 709. 
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arrangements for ensuring compliance: it is the national government that is held to 
account for unnotified or illegal aid, irrespective of whether it is responsible for the 
administering body offering the aid. 
Form of aid 
Article 87 concerns aid ‘in any form whatsoever’. Reflecting this, there is no 
definitive listing of the types of assistance that fall within the ambit of the Treaty 
provisions. Clearly, grants, tax exemptions, preferential interest rates, the acquisition 
of land and buildings on favourable terms are all covered. For some instruments – for 
example, guarantees,17 the sale of land and buildings,18 fiscal aids,19 and, most 
recently, venture capital20 – the Commission has issued specific guidelines, largely as 
a consequence of the difficulties involved in determining when certain forms of 
intervention constitute State aid. 
Complicated issues arise in the case of State shareholdings or capital injections. 
Consideration of these issues by the Commission and the Court has resulted in the so-
called ‘market investor’ principle.21 In short, if a transaction is undertaken in 
circumstances which a private investor would not be prepared to accept, then this 
would constitute a State aid. Over time, this notion has become more sophisticated. 
For example, it has been accepted that a private investor might be prepared to endure 
a loss in the short-term in making an investment if this were likely to secure the long-
term survival of the enterprise. Also, the Court developed the concept of ‘public 
 
17  Commission notice on the application of Article 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the 
form of guarantees, OJEC No C 71 of 11 March 2000. 
18  Commission notice concerning aid elements in land sales by public authorities, OJEC No C 
209 of 10 July 1997. 
19  Commission notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation, OJEC No C 384 of 10 December 1998. 
20  Commission communication on State aid and risk capital, OJEC No 235 of 21 August 2001. 
21  European Commission, ‘Public authorities’ holdings in company capital’, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, 9/1984 (OOPEC, Luxembourg). 
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creditor’ in Tubacex in considering whether a debt repayment and rescheduling 
agreement constituted State aid. In that instance, it concluded that the public authority 
was acting in the same way as a private investor would have done and the 
Commission consequently revised its recovery decision (European Commission 2001, 
point 312). 
The distortion or threat of distorting competition 
The provision of State aid does not, of itself, contravene the Treaty; in order to fall 
foul of Article 87, it must distort or threaten to distort competition (and, as discussed 
below, it must do this by favouring certain firms or products). In practice, this is not a 
serious limitation on the scope of Article 87, given the increasing interdependence of 
markets within the EU economy. Nevertheless, in Philip Morris22 the European Court 
rejected the Commission’s contention that aids always distort competition and that it 
was therefore not necessary to assess their actual effects.  
Evans and Martin (1991) have argued that the Commission’s approach almost 
amounts to a per se rule: ‘if aid is granted, the conclusion that the aid distorts 
competition is almost automatic’. Notwithstanding this rather sweeping approach, the 
Commission has also asserted that: ‘while all financial assistance to enterprises alters 
competitive conditions to some extent, not all aid has a perceptible impact on trade 
and competition between Member States’.23 This was the justification for the 
introduction of the so-called de minimis facility, on which basis the Commission 
considered that for aid below a given threshold Article 87(1) could be said not to 
 
22  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission of the European Communities [1980] 
ECR 2671. 
23  Community guidelines on State aids for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), OJEC 
No C 213 of 19 August 1992. 
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apply. In 2001 de minimis aid was the subject of a block exemption Regulation,24 
meaning, in essence, that aid of less than €100,000 in a three-year period to the same 
firm need not be notified for approval. More recently, there is evidence of 
Commission attempts to limit the scope of Article 87(1) by finding that there are no 
impacts on trade between the Member States. A recent example concerned support for 
the renovation of Brighton Pier UK, which a neighbouring competitor had challenged, 
but which the Commission considered had no effects on competition beyond the 
domestic market. 
Favouring of certain undertakings 
Article 87 does not apply if all undertakings in the Member State benefit from the 
measure without distinction between them. Aid is selective if it applies to a particular 
type of activity, a sector of the economy, a particular geographical area or to firms 
with the same characteristics. In this way, a line is drawn between measures of 
general economic policy, on the one hand, and measures which directly or indirectly 
assist certain firms or activities, on the other.25 This line is not always a clear one and 
measures that are ostensibly general may, in practice, be found to fulfil the selectivity 
criterion. For example, an Italian social security concession which provided higher 
rates of concession in respect of female employees was found to constitute sectoral 
aid since it favoured the production of goods in which female labour predominated, 
notably textiles, clothing, leather goods, and so on.26 The emphasis here is not on the 
intent of the measure but on its impact. 
 
24  Council Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 
88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, OJEC No L 10 of 13 January 2001. 
25  See Bacon, 1997, for an in-depth treatment of this issue. 
26  Commission Decision 80/932/EEC of 15 September 1980 concerning the partial taking-over 
by the State of employers’ contributions to sickness insurance schemes in Italy, OJEC No L 
264 of 8 September 1980. 
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The interpretation of what is sometimes known as the ‘specificity criterion’ is 
crucial in distinguishing between what constitutes a State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87 and what have come to be known as ‘general measures’. Moreover, the 
need to make the distinction is itself of paramount importance because Article 88 only 
empowers the Commission to take action against measures that distort competition to 
the extent that they constitute State aid; general measures that distort competition 
must be addressed through other mechanisms, with notably fewer and less powerful 
means of redress.  
The setting of interest rates is typically used as an example of a general measure; 
the base rate set applies throughout the economy and no particular groups are 
favoured. In practice, however, changes in rates of interest impact very differently on 
different firms – cash-rich firms will clearly benefit from higher interest rates whilst 
those with loans to service will be disadvantaged. Similarly, government decisions 
about the burden of revenue-raising – i.e. whether it should be on labour or capital-
related contributions – impact very differently on different activities. Nevertheless, 
such broad policy decisions are viewed as part of general economic policy-making 
and few would argue that it should be otherwise. 
State aid as an evolving concept 
A notable feature of State aid policy is the extent to which the notion of State aid is 
continually being refined, or even, on occasion, redefined. In the sphere of taxation, 
for example, the activities of the Council in the context of harmful tax competition27 
led the Commission to embark on a review of the tax arrangements in force in the 
Member States. An early casualty of this interest was the Irish 10 per cent tax rate for 
 
27  Conclusion of the ECOFIN Council Meeting of 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy, 
OJEC No C 2 of 6 January 1998. 
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manufacturing. In the 1980s, the Commission had not objected to this, reaching the 
rather surprising conclusion that it did not constitute State aid.28 By the late 1990s, the 
Commission had changed its mind and, following protracted negotiations with the 
Irish authorities, issued proposals for the phasing-in of a standard rate of corporation 
tax.29 This is now being implemented by the Irish government. 
An important recent issue in the definition of State aids has been the treatment of 
arrangements for funding so-called services of general economic interest (SGEI).30 
This has come to the fore for a variety of reasons. In particular, liberalisation and 
deregulation have altered the context for providing public services and raised new 
issues about public service obligations. This in turn has thrown into sharp relief the 
question of whether monies paid to organisations entrusted with the discharge of 
SGEIs should be regarded as compensation or State aid (a distinction with important 
procedural consequences for all tiers of government and a wide range of public 
services). A series of cases culminated in the Altmark judgment31 that identified a 
number of criteria which such payments must fulfil in order to escape notification and 
scrutiny under the State aid rules. For its part, the Commission has adopted a number 
of draft instruments designed to increase the legal certainty concerning the financing 
of SGEIs.32 Notwithstanding this, considerable uncertainty remains and it has been 
argued that yet more extensive legislative proposals are required to improve the 
 
28  The measure was clearly selective in that higher rates of taxation applied to services and 
agriculture. 
29  Proposals for appropriate measures under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty concerning Irish 
corporation tax (ICT), OJEC No C 395 of 18 December 1998. 
30  This refers to ‘market services which the Member States subject to specific public service 
obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion. This would tend to cover such things as 
transport networks, energy and communications’ (European Commission 2000).  
31  This case is attracting an expanding literature. See, for example, European State Aid Law 
Quarterly (3) 2003. 
32  Including a proposal for a Community framework for State aid in the form of Public Service 
Compensation, see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/>  
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transparency and predictability of the financing of public services in relation to the 
State aid rules (Rapp-Jung, 2004). 
The good, the not-so-good and the ugly: Commission treatment of different aid 
types 
As outlined above, the first stage of analysis for the Commission in considering a 
given measure is to establish whether or not it involves State aid within the meaning 
of Article 87(1); the second stage is to determine whether it can anyway be deemed 
compatible with the Treaty. The prohibition on State aid in Article 87(1) is far from 
absolute, but tempered by a number of mandatory, and, more importantly, 
discretionary exceptions to the general ban. The discretionary exceptions are set out in 
Article 87(3) as follows: 
a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State; 
c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas where such aid does not adversely affect trading to an extent 
contrary to the common interest; 
d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not 
affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that 
is contrary to the common interest; and 
e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council 
acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 
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It is for the Commission to decide whether one of these exceptions applies. By far the 
most important of these exceptions is Article 87(3)(c), although, as will be seen, 
Article 87(3)(a) has been used since the late 1980s to justify the authorisation of State 
aid to the worst-off areas of the EU on regional policy grounds. In broad terms, four 
main categories of State aid can be identified: horizontal aids, where measures are not 
sectorally or geographically restricted and aim to contribute to objectives that are 
viewed positively, such as support for SMEs, research and development and training; 
regional aids, where support is tightly controlled, or prohibited, in the more 
prosperous areas, but allowed to reach generous levels in the poorest countries and 
regions; restructuring aid, where the Commission’s a priori attitude is essentially 
negative; and sectoral aid, where frameworks have been developed to reflect the 
particular needs and characteristics of certain activities.33 An exhaustive review of the 
rules developed by the Commission policy in the various policy areas is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, not least because of the large number of regulations, codes and 
frameworks, but the discussion that follows highlights some of the key features of the 
Commission’s approach.  
Before turning to this, a general point is that the Commission takes a negative 
attitude to two types of aid: support for exports to other Member States; and operating 
aid. The former is never authorised by the Commission, for obvious reasons, and its 
opposition extends to aid schemes which explicitly favour export-oriented activities. 
So-called operating aid (support which is not tied to an investment or job creation 
project, but is of an ongoing nature or, for example, simply feeds into working 
capital) is rarely authorised. Last, it is worth noting that the aid types discussed in the 
 
33  For example, postal services, broadcasting, audiovisual production, electricity, shipbuilding, 
transport, steel, agriculture and fisheries. 
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rest of this section (horizontal aid, regional aid and restructuring aid) have no formal 
status.34 Although the Commission refers to these categories of aid, their precise 
content varies between documents. For instance, on occasion, the Commission has 
distinguished regional, horizontal (including rescue and restructuring) and sectoral 
aid,35 but in the more recent Scoreboards on expenditure it distinguishes horizontal 
aid (including ‘cohesion’ ie. regional aid), and sectoral aid. Clearly, this later 
classification reflects the political imperative to reduce expenditure overall and to 
refocus spending on horizontal objectives, including cohesion, endorsed in various 
European Councils. 
The ‘good’: horizontal aid 
In a number of policy areas, the Commission’s attitude towards State aid is broadly 
positive, often reflecting the existence of the EU’s own proactive policies. In several 
policy areas the Commission has adopted a block exemption Regulation, obviating the 
need for prior notification and scrutiny of aid measures that meet certain criteria. 
Instead, national authorities notify a summary of the aid scheme within 20 days of its 
implementation. The Regulations in operation concern aid for SMEs, aid for 
employment and aid for training.36 In several other policy areas, the Commission’s 
approach is essentially positive, but prior notification and approval is required and 
proposed measures are assessed by the Commission against published guidelines. 
Examples include support for research and development and environmental 
protection. 
 
34  The various sectoral frameworks are not discussed further; owing to their industry-specific 
nature in many cases they merit a chapter in their own right. 
35  See, for example, the Vademecum on Community State Aid Rules available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/> 
36  See <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/>  
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The block exemption Regulation for SMEs concerns support for firms meeting the 
size criteria.37 In addition, it must respect the rules on the types of expenditure eligible 
for aid (essentially general investment, consultancy and R&D) and the aid ceilings. 
These are expressed as a percentage of eligible expenditure. For general investment, 
rates of aid range from 7.5 per cent (for medium-sized firms in non regional aid areas) 
to 75 per cent of eligible costs (for small firms in the highest priority regional aid 
areas). 
The block exemption for training concerns aid for firms of any size. Training may 
be specific (ie. directly related to the current employment) or general (which is 
perceived to have wider benefits). The standard maximum rate (ie. for large firms in 
non-regional aid areas) for specific training is 25 per cent of eligible costs; for general 
training the standard maximum is 50 per cent; in both cases ‘top-ups’ are available in 
designated regional aid areas and for SMEs. 
The block exemption for employment aid only allows aid to large firms where 
they are located in a designated regional aid area or where the recruits are 
disadvantaged. SMEs are eligible everywhere and higher rates apply in the regional 
aid areas. 
The principles governing research and development aid date essentially date back 
to 1986.38 They concern aid for firms undertaking R&D, other than that 
commissioned according to market conditions (for example by an open tender 
procedure); public financing of R&D activities by public not-for-profit research 
establishments or higher education falls outside the scope of the State aid rules. The 
 
37  Broadly, medium-sized firms are those with fewer than 250 employees and small firms those 
with fewer than 50. In addition, certain financial and  independence criteria apply. 
38  The current guidelines are Community framework for State aid for Research and 
Development, OJEC No C 45 of 17 February 1996, p.5-16. 
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guidelines distinguish different phases of the R&D process as developments approach 
commercial viability. Accordingly, they allow up to 100 per cent of eligible 
fundamental research costs to be assisted, but only 50 per cent of industrial research 
and 25 per cent of pre-competitive research expenditure to be subsidised. Higher rates 
of award apply to SMEs and to firms located in designated problem regions. The 
R&D guidelines are scheduled for review before the end of 2005. A key consideration 
here is likely to be the essentially linear innovation model, an approach that has been 
criticised as being outmoded (UNICE, 2004) and the need to reconcile Barcelona 
Council objective of raising R&D expenditure in the EU to approach 3 per cent of 
GDP by 2010 with that of continued State aid discipline. 
The guidelines on State aid for environmental protection39 aim to balance the 
Treaty requirements of sustainable development against the imperative of undistorted 
competition. The underlying principle is that the ‘polluter pays’ so that only SMEs 
may qualify for assistance to meet existing environmental standards; however, larger 
firms may receive assistance to improve on compulsory standards, for relocation on 
environmental grounds, investment in combined heat and power, renewable energy 
and the rehabilitation of polluted sites. As under the R&D framework, higher rates of 
award apply in the designated problem regions and for SMEs. The current framework 
is due to expire at the end of 2007 but has been criticised on a number of grounds, 
including: the restrictive interpretation of the guidelines to cover pollution caused by 
the beneficiary; the impediment to innovative environmental policy that improves on 
lowest common denominator standards; the interference with national environmental 
policy options; and the failure to prevent distortions of competition, notably by 
 
39  Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJEC No C 37 of 3 
February 2001, p 3-15. 
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allowing higher than necessary levels of aid (Holmes, 2004; and Ewringmann, Thöne 
and Fischer, 2002). 
The ‘not-so-good’: regional aid 
Regional policy was the first area in which the Commission developed guidelines for 
the discipline of State aids. These date back to the early 1970s when the Commission 
sought to ‘coordinate’ the use of investment aids for large firms in the more 
prosperous regions of the Community, mainly in response to concerns at competitive-
outbidding for mobile investment. Over time the system of regulating regional aids 
has become progressively more elaborate, with the Commission becoming 
increasingly involved in determining the extent of the regional aid maps, the types of 
assistance that may be offered and the value of that assistance, such that large firms 
may now only receive general investment aid if they are located in the designated 
problem regions. At the same time, the emergence of EU Cohesion policy (ie. the 
Community’s own regional policy) has raised important issues of policy 
coordination.40 Indeed, since the late 1980s, the Commission has promoted the control 
of regional aid as a aspect of cohesion policy, viewing it as having the capacity both 
to contribute to cohesion and to undermine it: it has sought to rein-in the use of 
incentives to large firms in the richer regions, partly with the intention of maintaining 
a ‘differential’ between regions of varying prosperity; at the same time, it has 
recognised that incentives may play a role in attracting and maintaining investment in 
the problem regions and allowed aid on relatively generous terms. 
The current approach to regional aid is set out in the 1998 Guidelines.41 These 
have a number of key features. First, regional aid control is perceived in terms of the 
 
40  See Wishlade (2003) for an historical overview. 
41  Guidelines on National Regional Aid, OJEC No C 74 of 10 March 1998. 
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need to restrict assisted area coverage expressed as a percentage of the population. 
Within the stipulated ceiling - 42.7 per cent of the EU15 population - regions where 
GDP(PPS) per head was at or below 75 per cent of the EU average were deemed 
eligible for the Article 87(3)(a) derogation42 (around 21 per cent of the EU 
population).43 Second, the remaining population (around 22 per cent) was allocated 
among the Member States as quotas for the designation of areas on the basis of 
Article 87(3)(c). For most countries, this resulted in significant cutbacks in assisted 
area coverage, although all of some Member States (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) 
remain eligible for national regional aid until December 2006.44  
Table 5: Final coverage figures for 2000-2006 under Article 87(3)(a) and (c) 
 Article 87(3)(a) Article 87(3)(c) Total assisted area % 
Austria 3.5 24.1 27.6 
Belgium 0.0 30.9 30.9 
Denmark 0.0 17.1 17.1 
Finland 13.4 28.9 42.3 
France 2.8 33.9 36.7 
Germany 17.2 17.7 34.9 
Greece 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Ireland 26.6 73.4 100.0 
Italy 33.6 10.0 43.6 
Luxembourg 0.0 32.0 32.0 
Netherlands 0.0 15.0 15.0 
Portugal 66.6 33.4 100.0 
Spain 58.4 20.8 79.2 
Sweden 0.0 15.9 15.9 
UK 8.6 22.1 30.7 
EU15 21.9 21.1 43.0 
Note:  The 42.7 per cent ceiling was exceeded owing to the special treatment given to 
Northern Ireland. 
Source: Wishlade (2003) Figure 34 at p 205. 
 
42  This is essentially the same as the definition of Objective 1 areas for the purposes of EU 
cohesion policy. 
43  This ceiling was set on the basis that coverage should not exceed 50 per cent of the 
population, taking account of the then anticipated enlargement to 21 Member States. 
44  National ceilings for regional aid coverage under the derogations provided for in Article 
92(3)(a) and (c) [Article 87(3)(a) and (c)] of the Treaty for the period 2000 to 2006, OJEC No 
C 16 of 21 January 1999. 
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Third, although Member States were responsible for selecting the assisted areas 
within their respective quotas, the methodology was constrained by the guidelines and 
the outcome had to be approved by the Commission. Fourth, the validity of the maps 
approved by the Commission for national regional policy was timed to coincide with 
the Structural Fund planning period (2000-6) and a special derogation was introduced 
to encourage Member States to designate areas both for national regional aid and the 
Structural Funds Objective 2 within their respective ceilings. Last, the Commission 
imposed lower award maxima across the board, although aid values are set to reflect 
the severity of the regional problem; typically, these range from 50 per cent to 20 per 
cent net grant-equivalent.45 
A key feature of the evolution of competition policy control over regional aid has 
been the emphasis on devising frameworks within which aid schemes could be 
authorised, thereby obviating the need for case-by-case analysis of individual awards. 
The downside of this approach is that it shelters many thousands of awards from 
scrutiny, enabling them lawfully to be offered without any assessment of their 
competition effects. In the course of the 1990s the Commission, and to some extent 
the Council, became concerned at this lacuna in regional aid control and began to 
develop approaches for individual scrutiny and control of aids to exceptionally large 
projects. This culminated in the 1998 Multisectoral Framework46 which required that 
projects/awards meeting specified size and sectoral criteria be notified and evaluated 
prior to implementation, partly with a view to reducing the rate of award offered. For 
a variety of reasons, the 1998 Framework failed to have any real impact (Wishlade 
 
45  Net grant-equivalent (NGE) refers to the after tax value of assistance and is used by the 
Commission for comparing the value of all forms of regional aid. 
46  Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJEC No C 107 of 7 
April 1998. 
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2003, p 127) and was superseded by the 2002 Multisectoral Framework.47 The 2002 
Framework takes a more straightforward approach and applies an arithmetical 
formula to reduce aid rates to projects involving eligible expenditure exceeding €50 
million. This operates in a progressive way so that the larger the project, the lower the 
rate of award. For example, in a region where the standard award rate is 20 per cent 
NGE, the maximum for a € 100 million investment would be 15 per cent and for a 
€ 500 million investment 8.4 per cent. Moreover, the Commission must individually 
approve aid for investments of more than € 100 million where the aid proposed 
exceeds a specified amount; the onus in such cases is on the Member State to 
demonstrate that the aid will not reinforce a high market or increase capacity in a 
stagnant sector. Significantly, the framework provides for the Commission to adopt a 
list of sectors in which regional State aid would be banned altogether. In practice, the 
adoption of such a list was postponed due to ‘methodological and technical 
difficulties’ and to take account of Member State requests (European Commission 
2004a, point 389). The “technical feasibility and the political and economic 
opportunity” to adopt a list of sector with structural difficulties will be examined 
again by the Commission before end 2005 (Cavallo and Junginger-Dittel, 2004). 
The impact of EU competition policy on regional aid has been significant 
(Wishlade, 2003, chapter 7). Successive policy revisions have constrained the types of 
regional aid on offer and subjected the extent of the assisted area maps to intense 
scrutiny. Most recently, award values have been progressively reduced. However, 
arguably the most striking feature of the Commission’s approach to date is that it 
focuses on whether regional aid is justified, rather than on whether competition is 
 
47  Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects – Rescue and 
restructuring aid and closure aid for the steel sector, OJEC No C 70 of 19 March 2002. 
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distorted. Moreover, the emphasis has been on competition between Member States 
rather than between firms. In short, while the Commission has clearly achieved 
considerable discipline in the availability of investment aid to large firms, it is by no 
means clear that its approach to regional aid control actually ensures that distortions 
of competition are prevented. 
The ‘ugly’: rescue and restructuring aid 
Support for rescue and restructuring is perceived as one of the most distortive types of 
aid by the Commission which, in principle, views the exit from the market of failing 
firms as a normal feature of a functioning market economy. Nevertheless, intervention 
may be justified by social or regional policy considerations by examining the 
distortion of competition set against the employment effects of redundancies owing to 
closure and/or the regional effects resulting from the impact of closure on suppliers. 
Exceptionally, rescue and restructuring aid may be justified by competition 
considerations, for example where the disappearance of a given undertaking would 
result in a monopoly or tight oligopolistic situation.  
The current (2004) guidelines on aid for rescue and restructuring48 require all 
proposals to support large firms in difficulty to be notified individually.49 The number 
of cases is relatively small – 120 over the period 1990-200250 – but the amounts 
involved may be significant – ranging from under € 1 million to over € 20 billion. Of 
these, 35 cases involved Germany, 20 were in France and there were 15 each in Italy 
and Spain. (European Commission, 2003). In broad terms a firm in difficulty is one 
that is deemed to be unable to stem its losses and that, without public intervention, 
 
48  Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty OJEC 
No C 244 of 1 October 2004. 
49  Restructuring aid schemes for SMEs can be approved by the Commission. 
50  Excluding Treuhandanstalt operations in the former east Germany. 
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will go out of business in the short to medium term. Rescue aid is temporary 
assistance to keep the company afloat while a viable restructuring plan is worked out; 
restructuring aid is based on an approved plan to restore a firm’s long-term viability.  
According to the 2004 guidelines, rescue aid may take the form of loan guarantees 
or loans bearing normal commercial interest rates; however, it must be restricted to 
the amount needed to keep the firm in business and to the time needed (a maximum of 
6 months) to devise the recovery plan. In addition, it must be warranted on the 
grounds of social (ie. labour-related) difficulties and have no adverse effects on the 
industrial situation in other Member States. Last, it must be a one-off operation.  
Restructuring aid can be granted only if certain criteria are met. These include: the 
submission of a restructuring plan to return to viability within a ‘reasonable’ time; the 
adoption of compensatory measures to avoid undue distortions of competition (such 
as reductions of capacity or divestment of assets); the limitation of aid to the 
minimum needed for the implementation of the restructuring measures, to which 
beneficiaries must also make a significant contribution (normally at least 50 percent 
for large firms); and monitoring and annual reporting. None of the aid must be used to 
finance new investment that is not essential to restoring the firm’s viability. 
In markets where there is long-term structural overcapacity, the reduction in 
capacity required of the firm may be 100 percent, in which case the Commission will 
only allow aid to alleviate the social costs (eg. redundancy payments and early 
retirement packages) of restructuring and environmental aid to clean up polluted sites 
that might otherwise be abandoned.  
Restructuring aid can be granted once only (the ‘one-time-last-time’ principle). 
On the other hand, the Commission takes favourable view of aid to cover the social 
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costs of restructuring and allows for the capacity reduction and reporting requirements 
to be applied with greater flexibility in the assisted regions and in the case of SMEs. 
Rescue and restructuring operations have given rise to the most controversial State 
aid cases. Guidelines to set out how the Commission intended to handle such cases 
were first introduced in 1994 and tightened in 1999. In 2003 the Commission began a 
review of the 1999 guidelines, which expired in October 2004. In the first instance a 
number of issues were identified (European Commission 2003, p. 18), notably: the 
lack of a definition of firms ‘in difficulty’; the problem of applying the special criteria 
applicable to firms that are part of a group; the fact that rescue aid often has to be 
granted prior to Commission approval in order to prevent collapse of the firm; the 
‘one-time-last-time’ principle and the instances of firms ineligible for restructuring 
aid receiving further rescue aid; the need to clarify the various time limits; and the 
scope of compensatory measures – when can these be said to be sufficient ‘to mitigate 
the potentially distortive effects of the aid on competition?’ 
Commentators endorsed and added to this list of shortcomings (Nicolaides and 
Kekelekis, 2004; Anestis et al, 2004). In particular, Nicolaides and Kekelekis pointed 
to the lack of a definition of a ‘significant’ contribution by the beneficiary as being 
one of the most serious defects of the 1999 guidelines, not least because this 
contribution determines the amount of aid that can be offered. Moreover, unlike the 
other aid frameworks discussed here, the rescue and restructuring guidelines do not 
stipulate aid ceilings expressed as a percentage of eligible costs. As a result, the 
amounts of aid and the compensatory measures required were partly determined by 
the negotiating skills of the parties involved, rather than objective criteria. 
In practice, the 2004 guidelines retain the key principles of the existing rules, but 
introduce a number of important changes in response to some of the perceived 
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weaknesses of the 1999 rules. Specifically, the 2004 guidelines apply simplified and 
accelerated procedures for the approval of rescue aid and a formula for determining 
the maximum amount of rescue aid. In addition, as noted, the compensatory measures 
required for restructuring aid may be up to 100 per cent of the beneficiary’s capacity 
if the market concerned has long-term structural problems. Also, minimum 
contributions towards restructuring costs, varying by firm size, were introduced so 
that the obligations on shareholders are more explicit than before. Nicolaides and 
Kekelekis (2004) argue that while these provisions represent an improvement on the 
1999 guidelines, they are too generous in their treatment of rescue and restructuring 
aid for SMEs and fail to address a number of the points which the Commission had 
itself identified, including the definition of firms in difficulty and the timescale over 
which a return to viability is required. Nevertheless, it can be argued that, while not 
involving a radical departure from the 1999 guidelines, the new framework tightens 
up the rules, especially for large firms, so that increasingly only firms that have clear 
prospects of returning to viability and whose efforts to restructure will not damage 
competition should benefit from State aid (Valle and Van de Casteele, 2004). 
Although frequently controversial, the real impact of Commission decisions in 
rescue and restructuring aid cases is difficult to assess. A recent study (London 
Economics, 2004) points to ‘basic data difficulties’ that hamper the evaluation of the 
sectoral impacts of rescue and restructuring aid. Nevertheless, the study reaches the 
tentative conclusion that ‘perhaps, in a number of cases the recovery of a State aid 
receiving company appears to occur at the expense of EU competitors’. 
Current themes, recent developments and future challenges 
The control of State aids has enjoyed a higher political profile since the start of the 
decade. This partly reflects the substance of the Lisbon agenda and its emphasis on 
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economic reform, innovation and social cohesion, which followed on from the 
Stockholm Council commitment to less State aid spending overall and a reorientation 
of that expenditure towards ‘horizontal objectives of common interest, including 
cohesion objectives’.51 
Successive European Councils have added little in the way of substance to the 
means of achieving the ‘less, but better’ objective, at least in terms of concrete 
commitments to reduce spending by the Member States. Nevertheless, political 
discussions have given an impetus to Commission action in the form of so-called 
‘Scoreboards’52 on State aid expenditure cited earlier and a progress report on the 
reduction and reorientation of State aid (European Commission, 2002). 
Several important themes have emerged from recent Council conclusions and 
Commission reports: first, a consideration of the role of market failure in the 
justification for State aid; second, an emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
State aid and, related, a growing interest in evaluation and exchange of experience; 
third, a Commission commitment to consider the feasibility of developing economic 
criteria for assessing State aid impacts; and last, efforts to simplify, modernise and 
clarify the State aid rules. These themes are reflected in some recent developments in 
State aid control, notably the proposals for a significant impact test to underpin the 
assessment of some forms of aid and Commission working paper on the future of the 
regional aid guidelines. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of enlargement, attempts 
to integrate often diverse policy objectives and the growing complexity of public-
private economic relations, State aid control seems set to face a number of challenges 
for some time to come. 
 
51  Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm European Council, 23 and 24 March 2001. 
52  See: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/> 
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Current themes 
Recent developments in State aid control have given greater prominence to market 
failure arguments in the justification for State aid. On the one hand, it has been 
stressed that State aids should be targeted at clearly identified market failures;53 on the 
other, the Commission has emphasised the need to question whether State is always 
the most appropriate response to market failures – for example, it has argued that 
Member States: ‘should assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether existing market 
imperfections affecting SMEs would be better addressed through the provision of 
state aid, advisory and information services, the intensification of structural reforms, 
or a combination of these measures.’ (European Commission, 2002a). 
A related question is that of the efficiency and effectiveness of State aid. The 
Commission has procured external research which aims, inter alia, to draw up a list of 
criteria that make it possible to assess the circumstances in which aid is likely to be 
more or less effective (European Commission, 2002). For their part, at the November 
2002 Competitiveness Council, the Member States undertook to improve the 
exchange of experience on a range of issues, including ex ante and ex post evaluations 
of State aid.  
The role of economic analysis in State aid control is also rising up the 
Commission’s agenda. Two main factors appear to underpin this. First, the 
Commission has been sensitive to criticism of its hitherto rather formalistic approach. 
The Director General of DG Competition has observed that ‘there is the impression 
that we are simply applying rules which aim to curtail state aid as such rather than 
concentrating on controlling aid which really distorts the European single market’ 
 
53  2467th Council meeting – Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research) – Brussels, 26 
November 2002, 14365/02 (Presse 360). 
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(Lowe, 2003). Second, the impact of enlargement on resources means that greater 
priority needs to be given to those measures that have the most impact on EU 
competition and trade.  
There are two levels of analysis at which the role of economic criteria are 
relevant. First, there is the decision about whether a measure is caught by Article 
87(1) at all. Does it, inter alia, distort or threaten to distort competition or affect trade 
between Member States? As mentioned earlier, it has been observed that the 
Commission interpretation of Article 87(1) almost amounts to a per se rule, but some 
recent cases have suggested a rather more reasoned approach. For example, in the 
Dorsten Swimming Pool case, which has been highlighted by the then Commissioner 
as an instance in which the definition of aid has been more tightly circumscribed 
(Monti, 2001), the Commission found that there was no aid because there was no 
effect on intra-Community trade.54 As already mentioned, a similar conclusion was 
reached in the UK Brighton Pier case.55 
The second level of analysis concerns the severity of the distortion involved. This 
led the Commission to attempt to develop an economic basis for distinguishing 
between aid that is particularly harmful and aid that, although it falls within the scope 
of Article 87(1), does not significantly distort competition and trade (Lowe, 2003); 
this is sometimes referred to as a ‘significant impact test’. The aim was that this 
distinction could be reflected in procedural reforms that might ease the burden of 
examining less significant cases and identify those where closer scrutiny were merited 
(European Commission, 2002). This approach underpinned the so-called draft 
frameworks on lesser amounts of State aid (LASA) and aid with a limited effect on 
 
54  Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. N 258/00 – Deutschland – Freizeitbad Dorsten, SG(2001) D/ 285046 of 12 
January 2001. 
55  Aids N 560/01 and NN 17/02 – United Kingdom - Brighton West Pier, C(2002) 942 fin of 9 April 2002.  
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trade (LET). The objective of these frameworks was to enable the Commission have a 
‘light touch’ approach to the scrutiny of measures that complied with the LASA and 
LET criteria; in other words, there would almost be a presumption that aid meeting 
the conditions would be compatible with the Treaty.56 
The LASA draft proposed a new category of State aid: aid which exceeds the de 
minimis thresholds, but which is still regarded as too modest to pose a serious threat to 
competition, provided that it contributes to the achievement of certain Community 
objectives and that specified criteria are met. The LET draft was cast in a similar 
mould to LASA. While the principle underlying LASA was that ‘size matters’, the 
objective of LET was to provide a simplified framework for measures that could be 
expected only to have a limited effect on trade and need not be a cause for concern at 
Community level.57 
In practice, both proposals were dropped by DG Competition early in 2005. They 
failed to gain widespread support among the Member States, although the UK was an 
ardent supporter of a significant impact test approach. In addition, it seems probable, 
although unconfirmed, that the legal services of the Commission may have had 
concerns about LASA and LET being open to challenge in the Courts. It remains to be 
seen whether the Commission will make further attempts at devising a significant 
impact test as part of the wider review currently underway. 
A number of steps have been taken, or are envisaged, with respect to the 
simplification, modernisation and clarification of the State aid rules. In 2003 
Commissioner Monti announced that the Commission was reviewing existing State 
aid control instruments with a view to simplification and elimination of potential 
 
56  For an overview of LASA and LET see Wishlade (2004). 
57  As discussed earlier, measures that have no effect on trade do not involve State aid. 
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conflicts between the texts.58 Regarding enforcement and sanctions, the Commission 
has formalised its approach to complaints59 and indicated its intention that, in the 
future, reimbursement of unlawful state aid will be subject to interest at compound 
rates.60 Together with the procedural Regulations adopted over the 1999-2001 period, 
these changes amount to a substantial reform package (Lowe, 2003a). 
Recent developments 
Against the backdrop of these themes and trends, a number of State aid frameworks 
are due for renewal before 2007, providing the Commission with: ‘an unprecedented 
window of opportunity for a comprehensive review of the horizontal, and particularly 
Lisbon, objectives, and the new cohesion policy set out in the forthcoming Structural 
Fund regulations as well as to consolidate, and wherever possible simplify the 
rules.’(European Commission 2004b). In addition to the new guidelines on rescue and 
restructuring aid and proposals on aid for SGEIs discussed earlier, DG Competition 
has also begun to formalise it approach to aid to innovation, to review the R&D aid 
guidelines and, of key importance given the recent enlargement and the debate on EU 
Cohesion policy post-2006 (European Commission, 2004c), to consider the future of 
the regional aid control post-2006.  
A recent Working Paper61 on the review of the Regional Aid Guidelines sets out 
DG Competition’s current thinking on the reform of regional aid control post-2006.62 
 
58  RAPID Press Release, Mario Monti, Contribution of competition policy to competitiveness of European 
economy, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, SPEECH/03/264 of 26 May 2003. 
59  Form for the submission of complaints concerning alleged unlawful State aid, OJEC No C 116 of 16 
May 2003. 
60  Commission communication on the interest rates to be applied when aid granted unlawfully is being 
recovered, OJEC No C 110 of 8 May 2003. 
61  Review of the Regional Aid Guidelines – a first consultation paper for the experts in the 
Member States, available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/regional/> 
62  For an overview of the working paper and a more detailed assessment of its implications see 
Wishlade, 2004 forthcoming. 
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The paper states that it draws on the comments submitted by the Member States in 
response to its earlier consultation, as well as taking account of the literature on the 
economics and effectiveness of aid, including two preparatory studies commissioned 
for the review, the conclusions of recent Council meetings and its own experience 
with the 1998 Guidelines.  
The principal features of the proposals for future regional aid control as set out in 
the Working Paper are essentially threefold. First, that Article 87(3)(a) areas be 
defined on the basis of EU25 GDP(PPS) per head data, rather than EU15 averages. 
Second, that Article 87(3)(c) coverage be limited to so-called ‘earmarked’ regions, 
rather than based on national population quotas as at present. The “earmarked” 
regions are those losing Article 87(3)(a) status; very low population density regions; 
and outermost regions not covered by Article 87(3)(a). Third, that aid ceilings across 
the board be reduced. 
Overall, the Working Paper represents a very significant shift in the rules 
governing regional aid. There are both sharp cutbacks in coverage, most of which are 
borne by the EU15 Member States, and significant reductions in award values for 
those regions that will be eligible. The implication of the proposals for the EU15 is a 
fall in assisted area coverage of 20 percentage points compared to the current position 
(43 per cent to just over 23 percent). The cutbacks in total coverage within EU15 are 
dramatic – every country is affected except Greece – but they are not uniform. There 
would be no assisted area coverage at all in Denmark, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands or in mainland France. In Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK 
coverage would fall by more than half. Aside from questions related to spatial 
coverage, some wider issues emerge. At a country level, within EU15, the proposals 
virtually eliminate the possibility of conducting ‘traditional’ regional policy in many 
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Member States: this is the case, for example, for France and the Netherlands, where 
there would be no Article 87(3)(c) areas. Even in countries with some coverage, such 
as the UK, Austria and Germany, Article 87(3)(c) areas are, like Article 87(3)(a) 
areas, designated on a ‘top-down basis’, rather than by national policymakers, and 
may only partially correspond to nationally-determined needs and priorities. As a 
matter of principle, one might question whether it is legitimate for EU competition 
policy to dictate the substance and targeting of national regional policy in this way. 
A more general concern is whether the reductions in assisted area coverage and 
rates might affect the EU’s global competitiveness for mobile investment. Some are 
sceptical about the capacity of incentives to offset locational advantages elsewhere, 
but it is worth noting that the EU system of State aid discipline is unique; alternative 
locations are unlikely to display similar levels of self-restraint and are therefore often 
in a position to offer long-term tax and other advantages that may prove irresistible to 
mobile investors. 
Future challenges  
The developments outlined in this chapter bear witness to a policy entering a new 
phase. The increased emphasis on the economic impact of State aids is surely to be 
welcomed as a genuine attempt to address the arbitrariness for which past State aid 
control policy has been criticised. Nevertheless, recent developments in State aid 
control illustrate the incremental nature of policy change. The new rescue and 
restructuring guidelines are modest in the scope of change actually implemented; the 
proposals for a significant impact test in the form of the LASA and LET guidelines 
have been dropped; and the failure of the Commission to adopt under the 
Multisectoral Framework a list of sectors with serious structural problems are all 
testament to the political sensitivities and the technical difficulties and the legal issues 
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involved in altering the course of policy. In short, there are some very real challenges 
in trying to refocus State aid control. 
At a conceptual level, some important questions remain. The definition of State 
aid is still fluid and the increasing complexity of public-private economic relations, 
especially in areas such as service or infrastructure provision will not simplify the 
Commission’s task in determining the existence of State aid. Moreover, the 
Commission’s growing interest in examining measures relating to social security and 
taxation continues to raise difficult definitional issues; these seem increasingly likely 
to occur at the subnational level where trends to decentralisation and devolution may 
be difficult to reconcile with the Commission’s approach to regionally-differentiated 
taxation. 
Further conceptual challenges arise from incorporating aspects of the wider State 
aid reform agenda into regional aid control. The earlier discussion noted the growing 
interest in taking account of market failure in assessing State aids. Acceptance of 
market failure arguments is implicit in the Treaty provisions. However, the 
derogations from the general prohibition of State aid do not explicitly require the 
identification of market failure in order for State aid to be justified; moreover, the 
identification of a market failure does not, of itself, justify an exception to the general 
ban. Article 87(3)(c), which has formed the basis for most policy allowing the use of 
aid in derogation from the ban, merely refers to ‘aid to facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.’ The 
identification of criteria to establish what is in the common interest remains elusive. 
Would evidence of market failure become a requirement for State aid authorisation? 
Would it be a necessary, but insufficient condition for a granting of a derogation? 
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Where would the burden of proof lie in market failure arguments for State aid? Would 
measures that in the Commission’s view were ineffective be outlawed even in the 
absence of significant competition concerns?  
Challenges also arise from the emphasis on policy linkages. In particular, the 
notion of ‘cohesion’ and how competition policy control of State aids can best 
contribute to it remains unclear. Since the early 1990s, the emphasis has been on 
competition policy enabling, or at least not frustrating, the adoption of coincident 
maps for national and EU regional policies. However, this is arguably a rather 
superficial preoccupation that conceals the need for a more fundamental debate about 
the appropriate articulation of spatial policy objectives at different tiers of 
government. Besley and Seabright (1999) consider the pursuit of coincident maps as 
‘a very significant flaw’ in the Commission’s market failure evaluation. 
These conceptual issues spill over into and are difficult to disentangle from a 
range of technical issues. These are exacerbated by the combined effects of 
enlargement and the trend to decentralise responsibility for economic development to 
regional and local levels. This creates an administrative imperative to focus 
Commission resources on cases of most importance. However, there are clear tensions 
between what is theoretically relevant and what is administratively feasible; between 
arbitrariness and relevance; and between transparency and politicisation. The State aid 
control regime is easy to critique – there is excessive emphasis on formal aspects of 
policy and insufficient analysis of the real effects of aid on competition and trade. 
Moreover, State aid control policy as it has evolved is ill-suited to assess the 
increasingly sophisticated range of policy instruments being operated, or to 
considering those which it has not previously sought to address. However, critics 
should be under no illusions about the technical difficulties involved in addressing 
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these issues. There are important gaps in the understanding of just how State aids 
affect competition and trade that are not answered by the academic literature in ways 
that are of practical relevance; even where the Commission has developed 
methodologies that sought to address competition issues more directly (for example, 
under the motor vehicle aid rules or the 1998 Multisectoral Framework), the absence 
of relevant, comparative and up-to-date statistical data at an appropriate level of 
analysis undermined the practical application of the methodologies concerned and 
damaged the credibility of policy. 
State aid control continues to face considerable political challenges: from the 
outset, the role of the Council in State aid control has varied, with the Commission 
sometimes resisting Member State involvement and sometimes building on their 
apparent commitment to restraint. Recent developments suggest that State aid control 
is being considered more and more within the context of broader macroeconomic 
policy, reflected in the growing interest in overall levels of spend and the notion of 
introducing targets to limit spending. Whilst the Commission may welcome the 
support of the Member States as regularly expressed in Council conclusions, this 
support is less in evidence when national interests are directly at stake – for example 
when a major firms faces closure or the Commission seeks to exclude particular 
regions from eligibility for aid. Furthermore, in practice, Member State views on the 
matter are far from homogenous and the Commission may find increased Member 
State involvement in State aid policy formulation to be double-edged as countries 
float proposals that increase the Council’s input into State control.  
Looking forward, the control of State aid looks set to continue face many 
challenges in accommodating the disparate interests of firms and policymakers across 
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a Community with widely varying economic traditions and levels of economic 
development.  
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